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Purpose Proposals
Jill E. Fisch*
Repurposing the corporation is the hot issue in corporate governance. Commentators, investors, and increasingly issuers, maintain that corporations should
shift their focus from maximizing profits for shareholders to generating value for a
more expansive group of stakeholders. Corporations are also being called upon to
address societal concerns—from climate change and voting rights to racial justice
and wealth inequality.
The shareholder proposal rule, Rule 14a–8, offers one potential tool for repurposing the corporation. This Article describes the introduction of innovative proposals seeking to formalize corporate commitments to stakeholder governance. These
“purpose proposals” reflect a new dynamic in the debate over stakeholder governance
by enabling shareholders to communicate their views about corporate purpose to
their fellow shareholders and management. At the same time, purpose proposals
highlight the potential problems with a shareholder voting process dominated by a
handful of institutional intermediaries whose interests, particularly with respect to
corporate purpose, may not be aligned with those of their beneficiaries.
This Article provides the first analysis of purpose proposals. It presents data
on the introduction of these proposals and the extent to which they have commanded
shareholder support. It interrogates the justifications for the proposals offered by
their proponents. Finally, it considers the role of the shareholder proposal rule in
offering a mechanism for shareholder debate over corporate purpose.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Repurposing the corporation is the hot issue in corporate governance. For many years, corporate law scholars found common
ground in the principle of shareholder primacy—that a corporation should operate in an effort to maximize shareholder value.1
As members of the law and economics branch of the academy,
Frank Easterbrook and Dan Fischel are commonly associated
with the shareholder primacy norm.2 In truth, however, the dominant theme of The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, the
book that is the focus of this symposium issue, is the “corporationas-contract.”3 Easterbrook and Fischel explicitly recognized the
potential that shareholder primacy might lead to corporate behavior that was not socially optimal and that, “[w]hen situations
of this sort occur, there are gains to be had in overriding the corporate contracts.”4
Agreement on the shareholder primacy norm has evaporated.
In November 2019, the Business Roundtable (the BRT) issued its
“new” statement on the purpose of the corporation, replacing its
focus on shareholder primacy with a statement signed by 181
CEOs who committed to a purpose of maximizing value for all
stakeholders.5 Scholars have already written dozens of articles
and books arguing that the traditional corporate purpose of maximizing shareholder value is inappropriate and outdated, and
proposing that corporations reframe their purpose in terms of

1
See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637 (2006) (explaining and critiquing the shareholder primacy
norm).
2
See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Team Production Revisited, 74 VAND. L. REV. 1539,
1552 (2021) (“Shareholder primacy is a tie that binds together Jensen and Meckling’s
model, Easterbrook and Fischel’s contractarianism, and the shareholder paradigm”). See
generally FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991). As Ed Rock explains in his contribution to this symposium,
Easterbrook and Fischel in fact take the view that corporate participants need not contract
for shareholder primacy and that the purpose of the corporation is merely a term of the
corporate contract. See Edward Rock, Easterbrook and Fischel on Corporate Purpose, 1 U.
CHI. BUS. L. REV. 397 (2022).
3
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 7.
4
Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1439 (1989).
5
Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans,’ BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://perma.cc/A2GD-AM25.
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stakeholder and/or societal interests.6 Defenders of the repurposed corporation differ in their objectives and in the scope of
their proposals, but their general mission enjoys broad-based support from investors and commentators.
Corporations appear to be taking these concerns to heart. In
the last several years, a growing number of companies, even those
that traditionally resisted pressure to make their operations more
sustainable, have publicly announced their plans to improve.
General Motors announced a goal of phasing out the manufacture
of all gas-powered vehicles by 2035.7 Exxon revealed a five-year
climate change plan to comply with the Paris Agreement’s reduction targets.8 And HSBC reported that it will target net zero carbon emissions across its entire customer base by 2050.9
Whether these issuers will treat these statements as binding
commitments remains to be seen. One article studied the process
by which corporate CEOs signed the BRT statement and concluded that signing the statement did not reflect a meaningful
commitment by issuers to a shift in business operations and instead appeared to be “mostly for show.”10 To be fair, a true commitment to stakeholder capitalism would involve substantial and
perhaps costly changes to the way many issuers currently operate.11 Moreover, the BRT is a membership organization of chief
executive officers, not corporations, and it is not entirely clear
why a CEO’s individual support of a social policy would or should
drive corporate action.12 A meaningful change in corporate purpose would presumably require support by the board of directors
and the shareholders.
6
See, e.g., RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B. Thompson eds., 2021); ALEX EDMANS, GROW THE PIE: HOW
GREAT COMPANIES DELIVER BOTH PURPOSE AND PROFIT (2020); COLIN MAYER,
PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE GREATER GOOD (2018).
7
Camila Domonoske, General Motors Sets All-Electric Target for Vehicles by 2035,
NPR (Feb. 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/2TZV-QN7B.
8
Eric Rosenbaum, Oil Giant Exxon Mobil Pushes New Climate Change Plan as Activist Investors Circle, CNBC (Dec. 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/AM5Q-ULQ5.
9
Lawrence White, Sinead Cruise & Simon Jessop, HSBC Targets Net Zero Emissions by 2050, Earmarks $1 Trillion Green Financing, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2020),
https://perma.cc/2EPV-UH5V.
10 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 98 (2020).
11 See, e.g., Andrew Winston, Is the Business Roundtable Statement Just Empty Rhetoric?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/6S7J-Y3VA (“For many of the BRT
signatories, truly internalizing the meaning of their words would require rethinking their
whole business.”).
12 See About Us, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, https://perma.cc/CVD9-8UFG (last visited Feb.
12, 2022) (“Business Roundtable is an association of chief executive officers of America’s
leading companies . . . .”).
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SEC Rule 14a–8, the shareholder proposal rule,13 offers a vehicle both for developing shareholder support for a reframed corporate purpose and demonstrating that support to the board of
directors. Following the BRT statement, shareholders began to
introduce proposals seeking to have corporations formalize their
commitment to repurposing. This Article terms these “purpose
proposals.”14 Purpose proposals take several forms including seeking disclosure about the corporation’s existing commitments, restructuring the corporation to increase its focus on stakeholder
capitalism, and advocating that the corporation amend its charter
to convert to a public benefit corporation (PBC). For example, a
purpose proposal introduced at Fox Corp.’s Nov. 10, 2021 annual
meeting requested that the Fox “Board of Directors take steps
necessary to amend our certificate of incorporation and, if necessary, bylaws (including presenting such amendments to the
shareholders for approval) to become a public benefit corporation”
and that “one of the public benefits included in the amendment
be provision of the Company’s viewers with an accurate understanding of current events through the exercise of journalistic integrity . . . .”15
Purpose proposals are consistent with a long tradition of
shareholders using the shareholder proposal rule to encourage
governance reform.16 The modest ownership stake and relatively
low-cost procedural requirements for introducing a shareholder
proposal allow investors to place new issues before their fellow
shareholders, managers, and corporate boards. Although the subjects of shareholder proposals vary substantially, and some fade
quickly into obscurity, others gradually build sufficient support

13

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8.
The article uses the term purpose proposals to distinguish proposals that explicitly
address corporate purpose from the broad range of shareholder proposals that address
issues of ESG, social issues and stakeholder value. See, e.g., Say on Climate: Shareholder
Voting on Climate Transition Action Plans, CHILDREN’S INV. FUND FOUND.,
https://perma.cc/8H53-K9ME (last visited Feb. 12, 2022) (proposing “say on climate”
shareholder votes on corporate climate transition plans); Lorraine Woellert, Catherine
Boudreau & Kellie Mejdrich, Shareholders Target ‘White Man’s World’ with Record Demands for Diversity Data, POLITICO (Apr. 6, 2021), https://perma.cc/8KTN-BWPK (describing shareholder proposals addressing board and workforce diversity).
15 Fox Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 57 (Sept. 17, 2021),
https://perma.cc/V9T7-PZ2P.
16 See generally James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, The SEC’s Shareholder Proposal
Rule: Creating a Corporate Public Square, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1147, 1163 (2021)
(“[S]ome highly successful shareholder proposal campaigns influenced the broad adoption
of various corporate governance practices.”).
14

2022]

Purpose Proposals

117

leading not only to their implementation but to their incorporation into future standards of good governance.17
At the same time, shareholder proposals are controversial.
Critics argue that there are too many such proposals, that they
are frequently sponsored by retail investors with small stakes,
termed “corporate gadflies,” and that they do not enhance economic value.18 These concerns led the SEC in September 2020 to
revise the shareholder proposal rule to raise the ownership
threshold required to submit or resubmit a shareholder proposal.19 More recently (under a different administration), the SEC
staff issued new interpretive guidance rejecting its previous company-specific approach to evaluating the permissibility of social
policy proposals and stating that it would no longer approve the
exclusion of shareholder proposals raising “issues with a broad
social impact.”20
Purpose proposals present a novel twist. On the one hand,
they highlight the power of shareholder proposals to raise a new
issue for shareholder debate. The structure of the shareholder
proposal rule includes a mechanism by which the proponent and
the issuer present arguments for and against the proposal.21
Through the voting process, fellow shareholders communicate
their evaluation of the strengths of these arguments. These
17 Id.; see also S’HOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT, THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT
REPORT FOR THE 2012 AND 2013 PROXY SEASONS (Oct. 20, 2013), https://perma.cc/4NCNWTMG (describing successful campaign by Harvard Shareholder Rights Project seeking
declassification of corporate boards through the introduction of shareholder proposals).
18 See, e.g., Nickolay Gantchev & Mariassunta Giannetti, The Costs and Benefits of
Shareholder Democracy: Gadflies and Low-Cost Activism, 34 REV. FIN. STUD. 5629, 5630
(2021) (finding that “proposals implemented by active individual sponsors destroy shareholder value if they are implemented”); Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 1198 (“Finally,
we are concerned that gadfly investors are making an excessive number of proposals that
decrease the value of targeted firms.”).
19 Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds Under Exchange Act
Rule 14a–8, 85 Fed. Reg. 70,240 (proposed Nov. 4, 2020) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a–8). The rule has been challenged in the D.C. District Court. See Complaint, Interfaith Ctr. on Corp. Resp. v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, No. 21–cv–01620 (D.D.C. June
15, 2021).
20 SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14L (Nov. 3, 2021), https://perma.cc/EJ5Y-5VTK;
Sanford Lewis, SEC Resets the Shareholder Proposal Process, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Dec. 23, 2021), https://perma.cc/8NTD-FDKV (explaining the significance
of the bulletin and arguing that it will “make it easier for shareholders to write clear and
specific proposals that will survive a no-action challenge—which is a good thing”); see also
Letter from Frederick Alexander, CEO, S’holder Commons, to Gary Gensler, Chair, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 20, 2021), https://perma.cc/6VYC-2YWR (expressing concern
that SEC staff was inappropriately excluding shareholder proposals about company’s externalization of costs).
21 The rule allows the proponent to include a supporting statement so long as the
proposal and supporting statement are limited to 500 words. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8.
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evaluations may be further informed by third-party advisors such
as proxy advisors.22 The nonbinding nature of most shareholder
proposals allows this debate to take place within a framework in
which, regardless of the voting outcome, the decision to implement the proposal is ultimately made by the board of directors,
subject to fiduciary constraints. The shareholder proposal thus offers a relatively low-cost and low-stakes procedure for introducing
governance innovation.
On the other hand, the mechanics of modern shareholder voting offer new reasons for skepticism. Today, institutional shareholders cast the overwhelming majority of votes at shareholder
meetings.23 Voting power is concentrated in the hands of small
number of asset managers who manage the money of participants
in employer-sponsored 401(k) plans but who have no economic interest in the stock they are voting, a problem I have previously
described as “empty voting.”24 The beneficiaries in these plans
play little or no role in selecting the asset managers and determining their voting preferences.25 As a result, there is a risk that
the institutional votes that drive outcomes may not accurately reflect the interests of those with real economic stakes. This risk is
exacerbated by the shift from proposals that focused primarily on
economic value to proposals with societal and political implications, proposals on which asset managers may have particular
reasons to vote differently from the way their beneficiaries would
vote.26
This Article provides the first analysis of purpose proposals.
It presents data on the introduction of and support for such proposals. It considers how the shareholder proposal rule provides a
forum to debate stakeholder governance and corporate purpose.
The data indicate that, at least in this context, the shareholder
proposal rule is working as intended and provide evidence that

22 See, e.g., Douglas Sarro, Proxy Advisors as Issue Spotters, 15 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 371, 405–07 (2021) (describing studies on the effect of proxy advisor recommendations on support for shareholder proposals).
23 Institutional investors control as much as 80% of the voting rights of large publicly
traded companies. Sean Griffith & Dorothy Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1151, 1155 (2019). Moreover, institutions vote more than 90%
of their shares, while retail investors vote fewer than 30%. See Jill Fisch, Standing Voting
Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor, 102 MINN. L. REV. 11, 14 (2018).
24 Jill E. Fisch, Mutual Fund Stewardship and the Empty Voting Problem, 16 BROOK.
J. CORP. FIN. & COMM. L. 71 (2021).
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., Jeff Schwartz, Public Mutual Funds, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON
INVESTOR PROTECTION (Arthur Laby ed., forthcoming Oct. 2022) (describing potential selfinterested motives for asset managers to support socially oriented proposals).
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the Trump administration’s 2020 efforts to restrict its scope were
misguided.27
The data also indicate that, at present, shareholder support
for repurposing the corporation, at least through conversion to a
PBC, is limited. The Article identifies as one potential explanation the failure of stakeholder governance to confront the potential tradeoffs between shareholders and other stakeholders. Purpose proposals serve a valuable information-forcing role in this
debate. Although purpose advocates justify formalizing stakeholder capitalism as necessary to enable corporate decisionmakers to prioritize non-shareholder interests, they offer no framework or limiting principle with respect to that prioritization.28
This issue presents particular concern for institutional intermediaries. Purpose proposals force proponents to address these issues explicitly. Similarly, they force shareholders to consider
whether and how corporations should trade off among shareholder and stakeholder interests.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly describes the
evolving debate over corporate purpose. Part III explains the role
of shareholder proposals in corporate governance reform. Part IV
describes the new phenomenon of purpose proposals. Part V explores how purpose proposals can advance the debate over stakeholder governance and, in doing so, demonstrates the value of the
shareholder proposal rule.
II. THE DEBATE OVER CORPORATE PURPOSE
When the BRT introduced its “new” statement of corporate
purpose in 2019, it made headlines around the world.29 The BRT,
an organization comprised of the CEOs of leading U.S. companies,30 had long adhered to principles of corporate governance that
endorsed shareholder primacy— “that corporations exist principally to serve shareholders.”31 The 2019 statement purported to

27 See Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds Under Exchange Act
Rule 14a–8, supra note 19.
28 I have identified elsewhere the limits of the PBC in addressing stakeholder governance. See Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The “Value” of a Public Benefit Corporation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD (Elizabeth
Pollman & Robert B. Thompson eds., 2021).
29 BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 5; see Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon,
Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, 99 TEX. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2021) (reporting that
the BRT statement “made international headlines”).
30 Members, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, https://perma.cc/25FS-49FA (last visited July 9,
2022).
31 BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 5.
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supersede the organization’s previous statements in favor of a
commitment to lead corporations “for the benefit of all stakeholders—customers, employees, suppliers, communities and shareholders.”32
This revised statement of purpose tapped into a growing and
global corporate governance movement in support of stakeholder
governance. Following the release of the BRT statement, the
World Economic Forum published a manifesto stating that the
corporation’s purpose was to promote value creation for the benefit of all its stakeholders.33 Subsequently, corporate leaders, major
asset managers, and policymakers have embraced stakeholder
governance.34 As the Australian Institute of Company Directors
put it, “it is increasingly recognised that the best interests of an
organisation cannot be isolated from the interests of its stakeholders, including the community.”35
Although support for stakeholder governance is widespread,
there is considerably less agreement on what stakeholder governance entails. Lucian Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita identify different versions of stakeholder governance.36 In what they term
“instrumental stakeholderism,” corporate leaders consider the interests of stakeholders as a means to further long-term shareholder value.37 In “pluralistic stakeholderism,” by contrast, the
welfare of stakeholders is an end in itself and is valuable independent of its effect on shareholder value.38 By definition, therefore, pluralistic stakeholderism can entail the sacrifice of shareholder interests in favor of the interests of other stakeholders.
Stakeholder capitalism also raises questions of priorities—exactly which stakeholder interests count and what weight
should be given to their respective interests?39 Commonly cited
stakeholders include employees, customers, and suppliers, but
32

Id.
Klaus Schwab, Davos Manifesto 2020: The Universal Purpose of a Company in the
Fourth Industrial Revolution, WORLD ECON. F. (Dec. 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/7QD33UXT (“The purpose of a company is to engage all its stakeholders in shared and sustained
value creation.”).
34 See, e.g., Martin Lipton & William Savitt, Wachtell Lipton Discusses Myths About
Advances in Stakeholder Governance, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Aug. 25, 2021),
https://perma.cc/Q5FT-URUM (“The signs of the step-up in the embrace of stakeholder
governance by corporations and their major investors are everywhere.”).
35 5 Basic Principles for Effective Stakeholder Governance, AUST. INST. OF CO. DIRS.
(May 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/A5LR-ZP4F.
36 Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 10, at 108.
37 Id. at 108–09.
38 Id. at 114.
39 See id. at 117–18 (noting the range of stakeholders identified in state constituency
statutes).
33
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stakeholders might include the communities in which corporations operate or the public at large. Former Delaware Supreme
Court Justice Leo Strine has argued that stakeholder governance
should place particular weight on employee interests.40 Other
commentators have focused on the role of stakeholder capitalism
in addressing climate change and other environmental issues.41
To the extent stakeholder governance is merely a strategy for
enhancing shareholder value, it is unclear that it represents anything novel from a corporate law perspective or requires a reexamination of legal constraints such as corporate purpose or managerial fiduciary duties. If, however, stakeholder governance is
intended to authorize or even require the sacrifice of shareholder
value, it raises questions both about the extent to which corporate
law can or should permit that sacrifice as well as the process by
which such decisions should be made. Should a decision by a corporation to pursue stakeholder governance be made by the board
of directors? Should shareholders have a voice? And should the
decision be formalized through recognition in the charter and bylaws, the corporation’s governing documents, or by conversion to
a distinctive legal structure such as a PBC?42
III. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
As with many corporate governance developments,43 stakeholder governance has become the subject of recent shareholder
proposals. The Securities & Exchange Commission promulgated
the shareholder proposal rule, Rule 14a–8, in 1942, pursuant to
its authority to regulate the solicitation of proxies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.44 Rule 14a–8 gives shareholders
who meet designated criteria the right to submit a proposal. If the
proposal meets the thresholds and limitations of the rule, it must
be included in the issuer’s proxy statement and voted upon by the

40 LEO E. STRINE, JR., ROOSEVELT INST., TOWARD FAIR AND SUSTAINABLE CAPITALISM
(Aug. 13, 2020).
41 See, e.g., Sally Ho, Stakeholder Capitalism: The Climate Crisis Solution You’ve
Never Heard Of, GREEN QUEEN (May 12, 2020), https://perma.cc/7CP9-YYPS.
42 Notably, Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act proposed using
the public benefit corporation as a mechanism for holding corporations more accountable
to stakeholder and societal interests. See The Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th
Cong. (2018).
43 See Paul Rose, Shareholder Proposals in the Market for Corporate Influence, 66
FLA. L. REV. 2179, 2180 (2014).
44 See Jill Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46
VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1144 (1993) (recounting the history of the shareholder proposal rule).
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other shareholders.45 As a Ceres report explains: “For more than
seven decades, the shareholder proposal process has allowed both
large and small shareholders to alert corporate boards and the
investor community to their concerns and to request timely action
on emerging, or neglected, issues.”46 Today Rule 14a–8 is considered to represent the “epicenter” of the shareholder rights movement.47
Shareholder proposals have largely been understood as a tool
for shareholders to communicate their views to their fellow shareholders and the board of directors.48 Although shareholders can
and sometimes do seek to implement changes to corporate policy
directly through the shareholder proposal rule—such as by proposing amendments to the corporate bylaws—the majority of proposals are precatory, meaning that they are not binding and
simply request the board or the company to take action.49 Even
precatory proposals, however, increasingly lead to board action
when they command the support of a majority of the shareholders.50 The impact of shareholder proposals has been enhanced by
45 The rule explicitly authorizes the issuers to exclude proposals for a variety of reasons. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(i). The SEC staff oversee the criteria by which proposals are
excluded pursuant to the no-action process. See Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public Elections, 126 YALE L. J. 262, 273 (2016) (“Rule
14a–8 allows a company to exclude a shareholder proposal based on several specified
grounds with the approval of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance in what is called
a ‘no-action letter.’”). During the period from 2007 to 2019, the SEC staff granted no-action
requests in two-thirds of the cases in which they were requested. John G. Matsusaka,
Oguzhan Ozbas & Irene Yi, Can Shareholder Proposals Hurt Shareholders? Evidence from
Securities and Exchange Commission No-Action-Letter Decisions, 64 J.L. & ECON. 107
(2021).
46 CERES, THE BUSINESS CASE FOR THE CURRENT SEC SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL
PROCESS 3 (Apr. 2017), https://perma.cc/WT4Y-DVWH.
47 J. Robert Brown, The Evolving Role of Rule 14a–8 in the Corporate Governance
Process, 93 DENV. L. REV. 151, 151 (2016).
48 See Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 1197–98 (arguing that the shareholder proposal rule should be understood as a “corporate public square” “where corporate management and directors can take the pulse of their shareholders”).
49 Emiliano Catan and Marcel Kahan identify four areas in which shareholders have
the power “to initiate votes”: removal of directors, amending the bylaws, filling board vacancies and adopting a precatory proposal. Emiliano M. Catan & Marcel Kahan, The
Never-Ending Quest for Shareholder Rights: Special Meetings and Written Consent, 99
B.U. L. REV. 743, 749–50 (2019). Accordingly, if shareholders want to initiate any other
corporate action, their proposal must be framed as a precatory request or recommendation
to the board of directors. Haan, supra note 45, at 273 (“[M]ost shareholder proposals—and
virtually all social and environmental proposals—are precatory, which means that they
are recommendations and are not binding on management.”).
50 See Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Stephen R. Stubben, Board of Directors’ Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53,
54 (2010) (finding “reputation penalties” for directors that failed to implement a shareholder proposal supported by a majority of votes cast).

2022]

Purpose Proposals

123

the policy of leading proxy advisor Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) to recommend that shareholders vote against the
members of a board that fails to take action in response to a proposal that has received majority support.51
Historically, commentators have divided shareholder proposals into two categories: governance proposals and social policy
proposals.52 For four decades, a small number of individual investors, often termed “corporate gadflies” were virtually the only
sponsors of shareholder proposals. 53 For many years, the proposals sponsored by these gadflies never received majority support.54
Subsequently, religious organizations became a major source
of shareholder proposals. One of the most prominent was the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility (ICCR).55 Most of the
proposals sponsored by the ICCR were social policy proposals.56
Individual religious organizations have sponsored many highprofile proposals, such as Trinity Wall Street’s proposal seeking
to keep Wal-Mart from selling guns.57 Other social investors, such
as the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals and the
51 See ISS, U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
12 (Nov. 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/NU96-SBKX (explaining that ISS will analyze, on a
case-by-case basis whether to recommend voting against directors if “[t]he board failed to
act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in
the previous year”).
52 Haan, supra note 45, at 272 (“The academic literature generally divides shareholder proposals into a corporate governance category and a social and environmental category.”).
53 See generally Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, The Giant Shadow of Corporate Gadflies,
94 S. CAL. L. REV. 569 (2021) (tracing the rise and dominance of corporate gadflies in the
shareholder proposal process). A small number of individual shareholders continue to be
responsible for most shareholder proposals. Id. at 581; James R. Copeland, Frequent Filers: Shareholder Activism by Corporate Gadflies, PROXY MONITOR (2014),
https://perma.cc/HV4K-GPJB (reporting that, from 2006 to 2014, three individual shareholders have been the most frequent sponsors of shareholder proposals).
54 Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J.,
435, 479–80 (2012) (“[T]he shareholder proposal rule existed and was used for four decades
despite the fact that shareholder proposals virtually never received majority approval . . . .”).
55 Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder Access to the Proxy Revisited, 40 CATH. U. L. REV.
37, 80 n.266 (1990) (“The Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, an affiliate of the
National Council of Churches, has organized proxy campaigns among shareholding
churches, religious orders, and others since 1971.”).
56 Janet E. Kerr, Delaware Goes Shopping for a “New” Interpretation of the Revlon
Standard: The Effect of the QVC Decision on Strategy Mergers, 58 ALB. L. REV. 609, 610
n.7 (1995) (“[M]ost of [the ICCR’s proposals dealt] with questions that loosely may be called
‘social responsibility.’”).
57 See Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2015) (describing Trinity Wall Street’s proposal and ruling that Wal-Mart could properly exclude it from
the proxy statement).
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National Legal and Policy Center, also submitted shareholder
proposals on social policy issues.58 The Project on Corporate Responsibility, formed by Ralph Nader, was behind “Campaign
GM,” an effort to make General Motors more socially responsible.59
Among mainstream institutional investors, public pension
funds were the first to use the shareholder proposal rule, starting
in the 1980s.60 In the 1990s, labor unions began to use shareholder proposals to promote employment-friendly corporate policies or, more commonly, to promote general corporate governance
reforms.61 Institutions focused largely on governance proposals,
leading to an increase both in the number of governance proposals
and the support for such proposals.62 The corporate governance
scandals of the early 2000s accelerated investors’ focus on governance practices.63
Over time, institutional support grew for shareholder proposals advocating the adoption of so-called good governance practices like majority voting and the declassification of boards of directors.64 In 1987, for example, proposals to declassify boards of
directors received the support, on average, of 16 percent of votes
cast. In 2012, these proposals boasted an average of 81 percent
level of support.65 Traditionally, corporate directors were elected
by a plurality vote, and the idea of electing directors in uncontested elections by majority was considered radical.66 But shareholders used 14a–8 proposals successfully to implement majority
voting systems.67 In 2005, the California Public Employees’
58 James R. Copeland with Yevgeniy Feyman & Margaret O’Keefe, A Report on Corporate
Governance
and
Shareholder
Activism,
PROXY MONITOR
(2012),
https://perma.cc/LTE7-72VB.
59 Richard Halloran, Nader to Press for G.M. Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 1970),
https://perma.cc/K66M-VBNC.
60 Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174 (2001).
61 Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998).
62 Jill E. Fisch, The Transamerica Case, in THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW 46,
60 (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 2008); Romano, supra note 60, at 185–86.
63 See Kosmas Papadopoulos, The Long View: The Role of Shareholder Proposals in
Shaping U.S. Corporate Governance (2000–2018), HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/BT7N-ZDAE (“[T]he number of shareholder
proposal filings dealing with governance issues rose by 50 percent in 2003”).
64 Id.
65 See CERES, supra note 46.
66 Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Does Majority
Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (2016).
67 See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L. J. 1259,
1290–91 (2009) (describing growth in number of and support for majority voting
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Retirement System adopted a plan that included sponsoring majority vote shareholder proposals, and, during the 2005 proxy season, majority vote proposals received an average 43 percent vote
in favor.68 By 2017, 90 percent of large-cap U.S. companies elected
directors by majority vote.69 NYC Comptroller Scott Stringer’s
Boardroom Accountability Project sponsored proxy access proposals at 75 companies in 2014 and reported that, of the proposals
that went to a shareholder vote, two-thirds received majority support.70 As of 2019, the project stated that it had contributed to a
10,000 percent increase in the number of companies that had
proxy access.71
In the last several years, the focus of shareholder proposals
has shifted to embrace issues involving stewardship, sustainability, ESG investing, and corporate purpose.72 The SEC traditionally viewed social policy proposals with skepticism and, at various
times, acted to restrict their use.73 For example, in 1952, the SEC
amended Rule 14a–8 to provide that issuers could exclude proposals made “primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes.”74 Similarly, institutional engagement focused on governance proposals,
and proposals addressing social policy issues received more limited support.75

shareholder proposals and the subsequent “dramatic shift” in “the voting standard at most
major corporations”).
68 Majority Voting for Directors: The Latest Corporate Governance Initiative, LATHAM
& WATKINS LLP (Dec. 9, 2005), https://perma.cc/2Z5K-EENW.
69 Id. There have been similar developments with many other governance practices,
including independent directors, requesting proxy access, diversity, and “say-on-pay” vote
requirements. Id.
70 Boardroom Accountability Project, N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, https://perma.cc/PV39DQTW (last visited Feb. 12, 2022).
71 Id.
72 Papadopoulos, supra note 63.
73 See Harwell Wells, Shareholder Meetings and Freedom Rides: The Story of Peck v
Greyhound (Temple Univ., Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper
No. 2021–29, 2021), https://perma.cc/SQ2T-EE2Y (chronicling the SEC’s increasingly restrictive approach to allowing shareholders to introduce social policy proposals).
74 Solicitation of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No. 4775, 17 Fed. Reg. 11,430,
11,433 (Dec. 11, 1952). The SEC removed this restriction after Senator Edmund Muskie
introduced legislation that would have barred “exclusion of shareholder proposals ‘on the
ground that such proposal may involve economic, political, racial, religious, or similar issues, unless the matter or action proposed is not within the control of the issuer.’” S. 4003,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (June 23, 1970); see Fisch, supra note 44, at 1154 (explaining that the
SEC removed the restriction on social policy proposals in 1972, in response to this legislation).
75 See Romano, supra note 60, at 185–86 (highlighting differing levels of shareholder
support for corporate governance proposals versus social policy proposals).
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The growing public debate over a variety of social policy issues including climate change, employee rights, and racial justice, as well as the stakeholder capitalism movement, have increased the willingness of institutional investors to support
environmental and social proposals.76 In the 2021 proxy season, a
record thirty-three environmental and social proposals received
majority shareholder support.77
As social policy proposals enter the mainstream, they have
blurred the traditional line between governance and social policy
proposals. For example, board diversity, which has received growing institutional support,78 is generally understood to encompass
both a social and a governance component.79 Public pension funds
are increasingly sponsoring proposals that address ESG issues.80
Religious organizations like the ICCR have focused greater attention on governance and the relationship of governance to environmental and social issues.81 And new organizations are emerging
that function as ESG entrepreneurs. These include non-profits As
You Sow,82 the Shareholder Commons,83 the Center for Political

76 Kate Hilder, Mark Standen & Siobhan Doherty, Institutional Investors Have
Changed Their Tune on Supporting ESG Shareholder Proposals?, MINTER ELLISON (May
26, 2021), https://perma.cc/N2EG-JRU8 (citing research finding that “the level of support
for climate change, political activity and diversity related shareholder proposals has
spiked, due in part to the uptick in support from large institutional investors”); Jackie
Cook, How Fund Families Support ESG-Related Shareholder Proposals, MORNINGSTAR
(Feb. 12, 2020), https://perma.cc/62W3-HQ4E (“Asset-manager proxy voting support for
ESG-related shareholder resolutions has increased considerably over the past five
years.”).
77 Majority Support for E&S Proposals Almost Doubles in US, IR MAG. (Oct. 26,
2021), https://perma.cc/SBJ4-HM76.
78 Max Chen, ESG Activists Are Calling for Greater Board Diversity, ESG CHANNEL
(Jan. 15, 2021), https://perma.cc/3XEB-GVPY (describing the “big three institutional investors BlackRock (BLK), Vanguard, and State Street (STT), along with proxy advisors
Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis, [as] all pushing for diversity and inclusion as a major focus”).
79 See Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Centros, California’s “Women on
Boards” Statute and the Scope of Regulatory Competition, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 493
(2019) (questioning whether California’s board diversity statute is aimed at promoting
shareholder or stakeholder value); SEC Approves New Nasdaq Board Diversity Rules,
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (Aug. 12, 2021), https://perma.cc/B7EY-989X (describing
Nasdaq’s new listing standards regarding board diversity as part of an effort “to improve
corporate governance at listed companies”).
80 Emily Glazer, Shareholders Press Facebook for Governance Changes, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/89F5-CSHZ (citing proposals by the New York State Common Retirement Fund and Illinois State Treasurer).
81 Id.
82 About Us, AS YOU SOW, https://perma.cc/JZF4-CZ9V (last visited July 9, 2022).
83 About, THE SHAREHOLDER COMMONS, https://perma.cc/NC4C-33V6 (last visited
July 9, 2022).
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Accountability84 and investment management firm Arjuna Capital.85 Overall, the number of shareholders submitting proposals,
as well as the number of co-sponsors of proposals, has grown.86
Shareholder proposals take several approaches in seeking to
generate greater incorporation of ESG principles into corporate
decision-making. Many proposals request increased transparency.87 In the 2020-2021 proxy season, for example, shareholders
introduced proposals asking corporations to disclose the systemic
costs of antibiotic use in the company’s supply chain (McDonalds),88 data on workforce and board diversity,89 the climate risks
faced by the company,90 and how the company’s climate lobbying
activities align with the Paris Agreement.91 Proposals also seek to
impose greater accountability through board oversight of sustainability strategies or to encourage specific outcomes such as identification of greenhouse gas targets.92 Finally, shareholders have
submitted “say on climate” proposals, seeking to have issuers
adopt a process by which shareholders could vote on the company’s transition plan or climate strategy.93
In November 2021, the SEC staff announced a policy change
designed to facilitate the use of Rule 14a–8 for social policy

84 The Center for Political Accountability developed a template for a shareholder proposal requesting that corporations disclose their political spending and coordinates shareholder activism on such disclosure. See Recent Shareholder Engagement, CTR. FOR POL.
ACCOUNTABILITY, https://perma.cc/N5S4-8SDB (last visited Apr. 11, 2022).
85 Arjuna Capital/Proxy Impact: Over Half of Top U.S. Companies Get an “F” on
Racial and Gender Pay Scorecard, BUS. WIRE (Mar. 23, 2021, 2:46 PM EDT),
https://perma.cc/X2P6-PCN4 (describing Arjuna’s engagement through the shareholder
proposal process to seek issuers to close racial and gender pay gaps).
86 Elizabeth Ising et al., Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2020 Proxy
Season, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (Aug. 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/2YGZ-QDK9.
87 See Allison Herron Lee, Climate, ESG, and the Board of Directors: “You Cannot
Direct the Wind, But You Can Adjust Your Sails,” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 28,
2021), https://perma.cc/Y96S-7KXP (describing ESG proposals during 2020–2021 proxy
season).
88 Mark Segal, Amundi Files Proposal with McDonald’s Calling for Transparency on
Antibiotic Use in Supply Chain, ESG TODAY (May 6, 2021), https://perma.cc/S6W8-QHQZ.
89 Woellert et al., supra note 14.
90 Caroline Flammer, Michael W. Toffel & Kala Viswanathan, Shareholders Are
Pressing for Climate Risk Disclosures. That’s Good for Everyone, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr.
22, 2021), https://perma.cc/ZZL8-WMXD.
91 Shareholders Approve a Climate Lobbying Proposal at Delta, Continuing a Winning Streak that Shows the Importance of Paris-Aligned Climate Policy, CERES (June 17,
2021), https://perma.cc/UYA9-J3H3.
92 Peter Reali, Jennifer Grzech & Anthony Garcia, ESG: Investors Increasingly Seek
Accountability and Outcomes, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. (Apr. 25, 2021),
https://perma.cc/NAJ7-5SBM.
93 See, e.g., How We Evaluate Say on Climate Proposals, VANGUARD (May 2021),
https://perma.cc/B6FD-Z9WM (explaining “say on climate” proposals).
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proposals by removing the requirement that a sponsor demonstrate that a social policy proposal has a significant economic effect on an issuer.94 The number and scope of ESG proposals is
likely to increase in light of this change.95
IV. PURPOSE PROPOSALS
Purpose proposals stem, in part, from the BRT revised statement of corporate purpose and the decision by the CEOs of major
U.S. companies to sign that statement.96 On November 12, 2019,
Harrington Investments, a shareholder in Wells Fargo Co., filed
a shareholder proposal requesting the company to commission an
independent study and prepare a report on the feasibility of either
converting to a PBC or amending its governing documents to
adopt a similar enforceable public purpose.97 The Harrington proposal appears to be the first example of what this article has
termed a purpose proposal.
In support of his proposal, John Harrington explained that
Wells Fargo had engaged in a variety of misconduct that had
caused shareholders and regulators to lose confidence in the company and that had subjected it to a variety of sanctions.98 He argued that converting to a PBC would cause the company to have
“expanded accountability to shareholders for the interests of
those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, including
depositors, regulators and others who have lost trust in the Company.”99
In response, Wells Fargo commissioned the law firm of Richards, Layton & Finger to prepare the requested study and report.100 The report concluded that Harrington’s suggestions were
not in the best interests of the bank. It identified several relevant
considerations. It stated that Wells Fargo was able to, and in fact
already did, consider the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders. It highlighted the fact that the PBC was a new business form
94

SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14L, supra note 20.
Ellen Myers, Shareholders Seen Broadening ESG Proposals as SEC Changes
Course, ROLL CALL (Nov. 11, 2021), https://perma.cc/HE7P-ZE4Z.
96 The CEOs of all of the issuers targeted with purpose proposals during the
2019–2020 proxy season, and of 86% of the issuers targeted with such proposals during
the 2020–2021 proxy season were signatories. See Table One infra.
97 Letter from John C. Harrington, President & CEO, Harrington Invs., Inc., to Wells
Fargo Co. (Nov. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/NU93-X6SD.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 32.
100 RICHARDS LAYTON & FINGER, REPORT TO THE GOVERNANCE AND NOMINATING
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WELLS FARGO & COMPANY REGARDING
PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATIONS (Jan. 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/NU93-X6SD.
95
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which meant significant legal and market uncertainty. It also
noted that conversion to a PBC, at the time, required approval by
two-thirds and that dissenting shareholders were entitled to appraisal rights.
Wells Fargo’s board subsequently issued a statement reaffirming its commitment to promoting the interests of all its stakeholders and concluding that the company’s “existing corporate
governance structure provides our management team and Board
with appropriate flexibility to promote the interests of our various
stakeholders and to manage important environmental, social, and
governance matters without the significant uncertainties, costs,
and distractions that the [p]roposal’s implementation would require.”101 Wells Fargo sought to exclude the proposal from its
proxy statement, arguing that it had been substantially implemented, and Harrington withdrew the proposal.102
Harrington filed four other substantially similar proposals
during the 2020 proxy season. Harrington’s proposals all took the
form of “first generation purpose proposals” in that they sought a
report on the issuer’s commitment to the BRT’s revised statement
of purpose, and all specifically targeted banks.103 JP Morgan submitted a no-action request to the SEC stating that “the Company
already operates in accordance with the principles set forth in the
BRT Statement with oversight and guidance by the Board of Directors, consistent with the Board’s fiduciary duties.”104 It therefore sought to exclude the proposal as substantially implemented.
The SEC agreed.105
Bank of America and Citigroup unsuccessfully sought exclusion, arguing that the proposal was, inter alia, “vague and indefinite.”106 Harrington’s proposals were submitted to a shareholder

101 Wells Fargo & Co., Response of Wells Fargo & Company (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://perma.cc/NU93-X6SD.
102 Letter from Elizabeth A. Ising, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, to Off. of Chief
Couns., Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 27, 2019),
https://perma.cc/NU93-X6SD.
103 Harrington continued to target banks in 2020-2021. See Table Two infra.
104 Letter from Martin P. Dunn, Morrison & Foerster LLP, to Off. of Chief Couns.,
Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/KR22-V5TS.
105 Letter from Lisa Krestyick, Special Couns., U.S. Sec & Exch. Comm’n, to Martin
P. Dunn, Morrison & Foerster LLP (Feb. 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/KR22-V5TS.
106 Harrington’s proposal at Bank of America did not seek conversion to a PBC; it
requested the board to “review the Statement of the Purpose of a Corporation to determine
if such statement is fjreflected in our Company’s current governance documents, policies,
long term plans, goals, metrics and sustainability practices and publish its recommendations on how any incongruities may be reconciled by changes to our Company’s governance
documents, policies or practices.” Letter from Ronald O. Mueller, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher

130

The University of Chicago Business Law Review

[Vol. 1:113

vote at both companies and received the support of 10 percent and
6.91 percent respectively.107 Harrington submitted a slightly different proposal at Goldman Sachs, requesting that the board exercise oversight over the CEO’s signing of the BRT statement and
providing “oversight and guidance as to how our Company’s full
implementation of this new Statement should alter our Company’s governance or management systems . . . .”108 Harrington’s
proxy solicitation argued to shareholders that Goldman CEO’s endorsement of the BRT statement and the commitment to stakeholder value reflected in that statement were “disingenuous and
incongruent with Delaware law and fiduciary duty pursuant to
conventional Delaware corporate law, unless our Company converts to a PBC.”109 As Harrington explained, however, the focus of
his proposal was “the Company’s sign on to the Statement” not
the categories of stakeholder interests identified by the statement.110
As You Sow, working in conjunction with the Chang-Liu
Family Living Trust, filed two additional purpose proposals during the 2019–2020 proxy season at McKesson and BlackRock. The
proposals requested a board study and report on how the company
planned to implement the BRT’s Statement on Corporate Purpose.111 Both issuers sought, unsuccessfully, to exclude the proposals on the ground that they related to ordinary business operations.112 The proposals were therefore submitted for a vote at the
annual meetings of both companies.
LLP, to Off. of Chief Couns., Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 7, 2020),
https://perma.cc/C3NH-GK6Y.
107 Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report 4 (Form 8–K) (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://perma.cc/8KW5-FCRR; Citigroup, Inc., Current Report (Form 8–K/A) (Apr. 27,
2020), https://perma.cc/MX3V-FXL3.
108 Letter from John Harrington, President, Harrington Invs., Inc., to Off. of Chief
Couns., Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://perma.cc/TP7G-3D22.
109 Goldman Sachs Grp. Inc., Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX14A6G) (2021),
https://perma.cc/G3PJ-EXQH.
110 Letter from John Harrington to Off. of Chief Couns., supra note 108, at 4.
111 See BlackRock: Implementation Plan for New Business Roundtable “Purpose of a
Corporation,” AS YOU SOW (Dec. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/UR57-MJ3U; Letter from Sanford J. Lewis to Off. of Chief Couns., Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 5,
2020), https://perma.cc/SL72-4N59. McKesson also argued that the proposal had been substantially implemented.
112 Letter from Marc S. Gerber, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, to Off.
of Chief Couns., Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 20, 2020),
https://perma.cc/7VRG-9LH6; Letter from Scott Andrew Shepard, Nat’l Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y
Rsch., to Off. of Chief Couns., Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 8, 2021),
https://perma.cc/YDH4-WT4J (describing SEC staff’s refusal to grant no-action relief to
McKesson).
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Table One below sets out the purpose proposals submitted
during the 2019-2020 proxy season and the results. Of the seven
proposals submitted, five went to a vote. The proposals received
average support of almost 7 percent of the votes cast.113 The level
of support was substantially below the average level of support
for shareholder proposals which was around 30 percent.114 Significantly, the vote at each issuer was sufficient to permit resubmission of the proposal the following proxy season.115
Table One

Issuer
Bank of
America

Wells Fargo

BlackRock

JP Morgan

Citigroup
Goldman
Sachs

McKesson

Type of
Proposal
Report on
BRT
Statement
Report on
BRT
Statement
Report on
BRT
Statement
Report on
BRT
Statement
Report on
BRT
Statement
Report on
BRT
Statement
Report on
BRT
Statement

Sponsor

Annual
Meeting
Date

Result/
Approval
Rate

John
Harrington

4/22/2020 10%

Harrington
Investments
4/28/2020 withdrawn
As You Sow (the
Chang-Liu Family Living Trust) 5/1/2020 3.85%
Harrington
Investments

SEC
5/19/2020 excluded

Harrington
Investments

5/21/2020 6.91%

Harrington
Investments
5/30/2020 5.77%
As You Sow (the
Chang-Liu Family Living Trust) 7/29/2020 8.09%

Abstentions are reflected as no votes in voting results

113

See Table One infra.
Elizabeth Ising et al., Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2021 Proxy
Season, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (Aug. 19, 2021), https://perma.cc/Y9C5-W9N2.
115 At the time, Rule 14a–8 provided that a proposal was eligible for resubmission if
it gained the support of 3% of votes cast. U.S. SEC & EXCH. COMM’N, PROCEDURAL
REQUIREMENTS AND RESUBMISSION THRESHOLDS UNDER EXCHANGE ACT RULE 14A–8: A
SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE (Dec. 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/38YJ-Y3QZ. In 2020,
the SEC raised that threshold to 5%. Id.
114
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In the 2020–2021 proxy season, the approach to purpose proposals evolved. Two things drove this evolution. First, on July 16,
2020, Delaware amended its PBC statute to allow traditional corporations to convert to a PBC with a simple majority vote and
without triggering appraisal rights for dissenting shareholders.116
The amendments thus addressed one of the concerns identified by
Richards Layton & Finger in its report to the Wells Fargo
board.117 The amendments also provided greater protection from
liability for directors in connection with the task of balancing the
interests of the corporation’s stakeholders.118 Second, in January
2021, Veeva systems became the first Russell 1000 company to
convert to a PBC.119 Two other issuers, Vital Farms and Lemonade, conducted successful initial public offerings as PBCs, suggesting that the PBC could be a viable business form for a publicly
traded company.120 These IPOs addressed, at least in part, the
concern flagged by Richards Layton & Finger about market uncertainty.121
These changes led shareholders to shift their strategy. A
number of proposals, which this Article terms “second generation
proposals” directly requested that issuer boards take the

116 See Delaware Makes It Easier for Corporations to Become Public Benefit Corporations, POTTER ANDERSON CORROON, LLP (July 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/4HWH-ZF85.
117 The standards in other states for conversion to a PBC differ and are generally
more onerous than the amended Delaware standard. See Elizabeth A. Diffley, Elizabeth
K. Lange & Jennifer M. Lucas, Shareholder Proposals Requesting Conversion to Public
Benefit Corporations: A Fleeting Trend or the Future?, FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH
LLP n.4 (Aug. 11, 2021), https://perma.cc/YRE5-FTVE.
118 Id. This addressed the concern identified by Richards Layton & Finger about the
legal uncertainty of directors’ obligations in a PBC. See RICHARDS LAYTON & FINGER, supra note 100, at 6 (“[T]here is no case law in Delaware that provides guidance regarding
the balancing obligation of directors of public benefit corporations.”).
119 Veeva Becomes First Public Company to Convert to a Public Benefit Corporation,
VEEVA (Jan. 13, 2021) https://perma.cc/R7J5-L84L. An overwhelming majority of Veeva’s
shareholders voted in favor of the conversion. See id.
120 Lemonade was the “best IPO debut of 2020.” Wallace Witkowski, Lemonade Logs
Best U.S. IPO Debut of 2020 with More Than 140% Gain, MARKETWATCH (July 2, 2020),
https://perma.cc/UY44-K7LF. Vital Farms’ IPO was described as a “blockbuster.” Chloe
Sorvino, Vital Farms’ Blockbuster IPO Proves Wall Street Has an Appetite for Sustainable
Farming, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/L2KJ-CVAZ. PBCs had already
achieved substantial success in private companies. See, e.g., Fisch & Davidoff, supra note
28, at 72 (reporting that there were more than 10,000 PBCs formed as of 2021).
121 RICHARDS LAYTON & FINGER, supra note 100, at 7 (stating that “it would be difficult to predict the impact [converting to a PBC] would have on a company’s short and longterm stock price and market capitalization”). Prior to 2020, the most visible benefit corporation story was that of Etsy, which offered a cautionary tale of the potential for market
forces to overcome a corporation’s commitment to stakeholder value. See Fisch & Solomon,
supra note 28, at 82–83 (describing Etsy’s history).
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necessary steps to convert to PBCs.122 John Harrington again led
the way, submitting shareholder proposals at all five of the banks
he had previously targeted. At four of the five banks, Harrington
submitted second-generation proposals.123 The advantage of these
second-generation proposals was that issuers could not exclude
them as substantially implemented simply by commissioning a
report. Moreover, there was some precedent for shareholder proposals seeking to effect governance changes by implementing a
structural change; after North Dakota amended its corporation
statute to grant shareholders greater governance rights, shareholders filed proposals with at least fifteen issuers seeking to
have the issuers reincorporate in North Dakota.124 As will be discussed below, however, the extent to which conversion to a PBC
is an effective or necessary mechanism for implementing stakeholder governance is unclear.
Other shareholders also introduced second-generation purpose proposals. Shareholders James McRitchie and Myra
Young,125 working separately and jointly with the Shareholder
Commons, introduced seven similar proposals, starting with a
proposal at Tractor Supply Inc. on November 21, 2020 for the annual meeting on May 6, 2021.126 The Shareholder Commons also
partnered with Arjuna Capital to introduce PBC transition proposals at Chevron and Exxon.127 The Shareholder Commons focused on issuers whose CEOs had signed the BRT statement.
Two other shareholders introduced purpose proposals in
2020–21. The National Center for Public Policy Research introduced six first-generation proposals. All but one of the issuers

122 Under the Delaware statute, conversion requires both board and shareholder approval and cannot be implemented unilaterally through a shareholder vote. See Amy L.
Simmerman, Ryan J. Greecher, Brian Currie & Richard C. Blake, Converting to a Delaware Public Benefit Corporation: Lessons from Experience, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH &
ROSATI LLP (Jan. 27, 2022), https://perma.cc/T2EC-BRRX.
123 At the fifth bank, JP Morgan, Harrington requested “a report to shareholders . . . regarding potential conversion of JP Morgan Chase to a Delaware Public Benefit
Corporation.” Letter from Brian V. Breheny, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP,
to Off. of Chief Couns., Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://perma.cc/332Y-ZBBE. The JP Morgan board commissioned such a report and then
argued to the SEC that the proposal had been substantially implemented. Id. at 5.
124 See Harleigh E. Brown, Fredrikson & Byron PA, Reincorporation in North Dakota?
How the North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act May Impact Corporate Governance (Sept. 2009), https://perma.cc/3B42-GCTY. At least one of the proposals appears to
have resulted in the issuer reincorporating in North Dakota. Id.
125 McRitchie and Young are husband and wife. Copeland, supra note 53, at 18.
126 See Table Two, infra.
127 BlackRock, Inc., Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX14A6G) (2021),
https://perma.cc/6NJN-GNKV.
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sought and received a no-action letter from the SEC indicating
that the proposals could be excluded on the grounds that they had
been substantially implemented.128 The John Bishop Montgomery
Trust introduced second generation proposals at 3M and Amazon.
3M unsuccessfully sought to exclude the proposal on the grounds
that it dealt with ordinary business matters.129 Amazon was able
to exclude the proposal on the basis that the Trust failed to provide the necessary proof of share ownership.130
As the foregoing discussion indicates, issuers were generally
unsuccessful in their attempts to exclude second-generation purpose proposals.131 As the SEC staff explained, “the Company’s corporate structure is not a matter relating to the conduct of its ordinary business operations, but rather, an important issue that is
appropriate for stockholders to address at a meeting.”132 As Table
Two shows, most second generation proposals were submitted to
a shareholder vote. The level of support they received ranged from
approximately 1 percent at Alphabet and Facebook (which both
have dual class voting structures) to almost 12 percent at Yelp.
Of the fifteen transition proposals that went to a vote, the average
support received was 3.3 percent. By way of comparison, Georgeson reported that average support for environmental shareholder
proposals during the 2021 proxy season exceeded 39 percent, and
support for social proposals averaged 33 percent.133 Notably,
128 Ising et al., supra note 114; see also Letter from Amy C. Seidel, Partner, Faegre
Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, to Off. of Chief Couns., Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (Feb. 5, 2021), https://perma.cc/8ALB-FK64. Apple also argued that the proposal
was inconsistent with California law. See Apple Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2021
SEC NO-ACT. LEXIS 546, at *11 (Dec. 22, 2021) (“California law does not recognize the
corporate form of a PBC.”). The Wal-Mart proposal was voted on at the annual meeting
where it received the support of 2.32% of votes cast. See Table Two infra.
129 Letter from Alan L. Dye, Hogan Lovells US LLP, to Off. of Chief Couns., Div. of
Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 31, 2020), https://perma.cc/C95X-JCQP.
130 Letter from Ronald O. Mueller, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, to Off. of Chief
Couns., Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 25, 2021),
https://perma.cc/2558-9U4W; Ising et al., supra note 114, at 27 (concurring that the proposal is excludable since the proponent failed to substantiate his eligibility to submit the
proposal under Rule 14a–8).
131 Letter from Jennifer H. Noonan, Bass Berry & Sims PLC, to Off. of Chief Couns.,
Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 29. 2021), https://perma.cc/H3U7M2MA; Nathan J. Stuhlmiller & Ryan A. Salem, Elimination of Statutory Barriers May
Lead to New Wave of Public Benefit Corporations, DEL. BUS. CT. INSIDER (Feb. 24, 2021),
https://perma.cc/VL7N-S4Q8.
132 See The S’holder Commons, The Shareholder Commons Reaches Agreement to
Withdraw Shareholder Proposal, PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/3MUFQC6S (describing the basis for the SEC’s decision at Broadridge); Broadridge Fin. Sols.,
Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2021 SEC NO-ACT. LEXIS 422 (Sept. 22, 2021).
133 Majority Support for E&S Proposals Almost Doubles in US, CORP. SECRETARY
(Oct. 28, 2021), https://perma.cc/D28L-4JMH.
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neither ISS nor Glass Lewis recommended in favor of the proposals.134
Table Two sets out the purpose proposals submitted during
the 2020–2021 proxy season, whether issuers sought to exclude
the proposal from their proxy statements, and the decisions by
the SEC staff on those requests, where available.135
Table Two
Result/

SEC

Type of

Annual Meet- Approval involve-

Issuer

Proposal Sponsor

ing Date

Bank

Transition

of America

to a PBC

Rate

ment
Not
Chal-

John Harrington

4/20/2021

Report

2.62%

lenged

Not Voted on

Johnson

on BRT

& Johnson

Statement Public Policy Research

National Center for
4/22/2021
Not

Transition Harrington
Wells Fargo

to a PBC

Investments

Chal4/27/2021

3%

lenged
Not

Transition Harrington
Citigroup

to a PBC

Investments

Goldman

Transition Harrington

Sachs

to a PBC

Chal4/27/2021

2.49%

lenged
Not

Investments

Chal4/29/2021

2%

lenged
Not

Transition The Shareholder Commons
S&P Global

to a PBC

(Myra Young)

Chal5/5/2021

3.86%

lenged

134 SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2021 PROXY SEASON REVIEW: PART I, RULE 14A–8
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS (July 27, 2021), https://perma.cc/2C6G-GTBZ (finding that ISS
did not recommend in favor of any of the proposals); GLASS LEWIS, PROXY SEASON REVIEW
2021 (2021), https://perma.cc/6VGP-66TF (stating that Glass Lewis did not recommend in
favor of any of the proposals); THE S’HOLDER COMMONS, THE BETA STANDARD PROXY
REVIEW 2021 (Aug. 2021), https://perma.cc/JB6D-ZBSQ (“[N]either ISS nor Glass
Lewis—the two biggest and most powerful proxy advisors—supported any of our proposals
in 2021, despite both firms continuously increasing support for ESG-oriented proposals.”).
135 In 2019, the SEC changed its longtime practice of responding in writing to issuer
requests to exclude a shareholder proposal. See Announcement Regarding Rule 14a–8 NoAction Requests, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sep. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/48UV-M4X9.
As a result, it is not possible to determine the percent of purpose proposals at which an
issuer unsuccessfully requested exclusion. In December 2021, the SEC announced a reversal of this policy. See Announcement Regarding Staff Responses to Rule 14a–8 No-Action
Requests, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/MP9D-TRJV.
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Chal-

Tractor Supply Transition The Shareholder Commons
Corp.

to a PBC

(James McRitchie)

lenged/ Not
5/6/2021

Report

3.47%

Excluded

Not Voted on

Duke

on

Energy

Statement Public Policy Research

BRT National Center for
5/6/2021
Chal-

Transition The John Bishop
3M

to a PBC

lenged/ Not

Montgomery Trust

5/11/2021

2.92%

Excluded
Not

United Parcel Transition The Shareholder
Service

JP Morgan

Chal-

to a PBC

Commons (Myra Young)

Report

National

on BRT

Center for

5/13/2021

3.40%

lenged

Withdrawn/
Substantially

Statement Public Policy Research

5/18/2021

Implemented
Not

Transition The Shareholder Commons
BlackRock

to a PBC

(James McRitchie)

Chal5/26/2021

2.39%

lenged
Not

Transition
Facebook

to a PBC

ChalThe Shareholder Commons 5/26/2021

1%

lenged
Not

Transition Arjuna Capital and The
Chevron

to a PBC

Shareholder Commons

Chal5/26/2021

Report
on BRT
Amazon

3%

lenged

Not Voted on
National Center for

Statement Public Policy Research

5/26/2021

The Shareholder
Commons

Chal-

Transition (James McRitchie
Alphabet

Wal-Mart

to a PBC

and Myra K. Young)

Report

National

on BRT

Center for Public Policy Re-

Statement search

lenged/ Not
6/2/2021

1.16%

Excluded

6/2/2021

2.32%

N/A
Not

Transition Shareholder
Yelp

to a PBC

Commons

(James McRitchie)

Chal6/3/2021

11.80%

lenged
Not

Transition The Shareholder Commons
Caterpillar

to a PBC

(Myra Young)

Chal6/9/2021

2.92%

lenged
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Not Voted on

National Center for

Statement Public Policy Research

6/9/2021

Transition
Salesforce

to a PBC

Shareholder Commons

6/10/2021

Report
on BRT
Salesforce

3.50%

N/A

Not Voted on
National Center for

Statement Public Policy Research

6/10/2021

Abstentions are reflected as no votes in voting results

As the 2022 proxy season begins, shareholders have submitted several purpose proposals.136 Notably, at least in the case of
Fox Corp., the proposal identifies a specific public benefit for Fox
to pursue upon conversion to a PBC, the “provision of the Company’s viewers with an accurate understanding of current events
through the exercise of journalistic integrity.”137 Including a specific public benefit in the proposal responds to a concern I have
identified elsewhere about the failure of PBCs to articulate adequately their intended public benefits.138 This enhanced precision
in the description of the shareholder’s objectives in seeking PBC
conversion reflects an evolution in the purpose proposal that I describe as a third-generation proposal. Table Three identifies the
proposals that have been introduced for the 2021-2022 proxy season for which information is available.

136

See Table Three, infra.
Fox Corp., supra note 15, at 57.
138 See Fisch & Davidoff, supra note 28; see also Simmerman et al., supra note 122
(noting the importance of “craft[ing] an appropriate public benefit purpose to include in
the company’s certificate of incorporation”).
137
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Table Three
Type of
Issuer

Proposal

Sponsor

Annual

Result/

Meeting

Approval

Date

Rate

SEC involv.

11/10/2021

1.1%

N/A

Shareholder
Commons and
Principles for
Fox

Transition

Responsible

Corp.

to a PBC

Investment

Broad-

Transition

James

ridge

to a PBC

McRitchie

Challenged
Settled/

Not

11/18/2021

Withdrawn

Excluded

Upcoming

Pending

Challenged

Upcoming

Pending

Challenged

National
Center for
Apple

Transition

Public Policy

to a PBC

Research
Myra
K. Young and

Apple

Transition

James

to an PBC

McRitchie

Because most of these proposals will not become public until
the issuers file their proxy statements, as this article goes to
press, it is impossible to determine how many such proposals will
be introduced. Shareholders may continue to explore the role of
PBC conversion in facilitating stakeholder governance through
purpose proposals. Notably, issuers have not generally succeeded
in excluding such proposals under Rule 14a–8. The SEC staff appears to have taken the view that purpose proposals are a proper
subject for a shareholder proposal and not excludable on the
ground that they relate to an issuer’s ordinary business operations.139
At the same time, there are reasons to question the continued
viability of purpose proposals. As noted above, the conversion proposals submitted during the 2020–2021 proxy season received
very limited support. The major proxy advisory firms did not recommend in favor of them, although neither has documented a formal position on purpose proposals generally.140 Large
139 SEC Staff No-Action Letter, supra note 132 (“[T]he Company’s corporate structure
is not a matter relating to the conduct of its ordinary business operations, but rather, an
important issue that is appropriate for stockholders to address at a meeting.”).
140 Proxy advisory firms currently consider proposals for PBC conversion on a caseby-case basis, and, as with other voting issues, may distinguish between a shareholder
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institutional investors, which command substantial voting power,
did not support purpose proposals, an issue that this Article explore in further detail in the next Part. In the near term, shareholders may focus on more traditional disclosure requests in
shareholder proposals to focus on societal or stakeholder issues.141
Whether or not they continue to submit purpose proposals, however, those proposals offer important insights into both the debate
over stakeholder governance and the role of shareholder proposals. The next Part considers these insights.
V. PURPOSE PROPOSALS AND STAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE
Purpose proposals provide a useful case study by which to examine in detail the debate over stakeholder governance, the utility of the PBC for implementing stakeholder governance, and the
role of shareholder proposals in identifying and sharpening arguments for governance reform in the public corporation. This Part
explores how purpose proposals provide insights into these issues.
A. The Information-Generative Role of Purpose Proposals
As the preceding discussion documents, purpose proposals
have served several functions in the debate over stakeholder governance. They empowered shareholders to bring a key governance
reform to the forefront. They required proponents to identify the
scope of their proposal and the manner in which it would affect
corporate behavior with a reasonable degree of precision. They
provided a forum in which both the proponent and management
could articulate arguments for and against the proposal. They
then allowed the rest of the shareholder base to communicate support for the reform through the voting process. In so doing, Rule
14a–8 creates a process in which corporate participants can address and refine critical questions regarding the meaning and significance of stakeholder governance.
Critically, the structure of Rule 14a–8 facilitates the generation of information relevant to the stakeholder governance debate. The structure of Rule 14a–8 itself generates information. In
addition to the proposal itself, the rule allows the shareholder to
submit a supporting statement. Although the shareholder is
proposal and a management-sponsored effort to convert to a PBC. See Simmerman et al.,
supra note 122 (providing guidelines for management-sponsored PBC conversion).
141 See, e.g., System Stewardship Shareholder Proposals–2022, THE S’HOLDER
COMMONS, https://perma.cc/68ES-RWBX (last visited Apr. 12, 2022) (identifying shareholder proposals introduced during 2021–2022 proxy season as of April 3, 2022 and identifying only two purpose proposals).
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limited to 500 words in the proxy statement itself, shareholders
can supplement that information with additional soliciting material without filing a separate proxy statement.142 In addition,
some shareholders have recently begun making voluntary filings
of additional solicitation materials with the SEC.143 These notices
of “exempt solicitations” are required only of institutional shareholders (those who own more than $5 million of securities).144 Still,
smaller shareholders are making these filings voluntarily to provide additional support for their proposals or respond to management’s arguments without being limited to 500 words. Significantly, these posts appear on the issuer’s EDGAR page and are
accessible by the general public.145 Harrington, the Shareholder
Commons, and Arjuna Capital have all filed exempt solicitations
to provide further details about their arguments and to respond
to the company’s opposition.146 In addition, issuers address shareholder proposals in the proxy statement as well, providing responses to the shareholder arguments and, in the case of purpose
proposals, articulating the reasons why conversion to a PBC is
not in the corporation’s best interests. Significantly, these issuer
responses are not subject to the 500-word limit, and as James Cox
and Randall Thomas explain, the proxy statement typically includes “a detailed and long explanation [by management] of why
shareholders should reject the proposal.”147
Importantly, because the statements by both the proponent
and, especially, the statements by management are made as part
of the proxy solicitation process, they are subject to Rule 14a-9’s
prohibition on proxy fraud.148 This context matters. At least one
court has recognized that even statements which might otherwise
be viewed as generic or aspirational can be actionable in the
142

Such solicitations are exempt under Rule 14a–2(b). 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–6(g).
Elizabeth Ising & Ronald Mueller, New Twist for Old Shareholder Proposal Tactic,
GIBSON DUNN SEC. REGUL. & CORP. GOVERNANCE MONITOR (Mar. 16, 2018),
https://perma.cc/WJC7-C6FA.
144 Rule 14a–6(g) imposes this requirement. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–6(g).
145 Id.
146 See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. Inc., Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX14A6G)
(2020) [hereinafter United Parcel Serv. Inc., Notice of Exempt Solicitation],
https://perma.cc/KB3V-5XDK (exempt solicitation by the Shareholder Commons); Chevron Corp., Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX14A6G) (2021) [hereinafter Chevron
Corp., Notice of Exempt Solicitation by Arjuna Capital and The Shareholder Commons],
https://perma.cc/2YC5-7ZM7 (exempt solicitation by Arjuna Capital and The Shareholder
Commons at Chevron); Chevron Corp., Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX14A6G)
(2021), https://perma.cc/L9YP-JL2V (exempt solicitation by Harrington Capital at Wells
Fargo).
147 Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 1166.
148 See 17 C.F.R § 240.14a–9.
143
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context of a proxy solicitation in which they are part of an effort
to influence the vote on a shareholder proposal.149 In First Energy,
the court observed that, where management statements of compliance were proffered as a rationale for voting against a shareholder proposal seeking increased oversight, they could not be defended as “mere ‘puffery’ or ‘corporate cheerleading.’” 150 This
potential liability exposure should provide heightened incentives
for accurate disclosures.
This information-generative process is advancing the debate
over stakeholder governance. First, purpose proposals enable
their proponents to explain why there is a need for change in corporate objectives. Second, proponents explain how stakeholder
capitalism can respond to that need by enabling corporate decision-makers to shift their objective from an exclusive focus on
shareholder profit toward a broader consideration of stakeholder
interests. Third, purpose proposals defend the role of the PBC
both in empowering corporations to engage in stakeholder capitalism and providing a meaningful commitment to its goals.
As John Harrington explained in his initial proposal to Wells
Fargo, stakeholders, regulators, and the public at large have generally lost confidence in the willingness of corporate decisionmakers to do the right thing.151 Similarly, Arjuna Capital argued
in support of its PBC transition proposal that Chevron’s pursuit
of financial returns was contrary to the interests of diversified
universal investors who were exposed to “growing and widespread climate costs.”152 At UPS, the Shareholder Commons cited
concerns about the company’s impact on climate change, its role
in fostering discrimination and inequality, and its use of political

149 See In re FirstEnergy Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 20–cv–3785, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
39308, *31–32 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2022) (describing management statements of a compliance policy that was “presented as a reason to defeat a shareholder proposal for increased
political oversight but was not then being followed by the Company or its senior management” as potentially false and misleading).
150 Id. at *29–30 (“Context changes the meaning of those statements from aspiration
to assurance; the speakers are claiming that increased oversight is not necessary because
the Company is compliant and has effective controls.”).
151 See Letter from Elizabeth Ising, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, to Off. of Chief
Couns., Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://perma.cc/PF8S-H9H3 (describing the company’s misconduct and arguing that becoming a PBC would cause Wells Fargo to “have expanded accountability to shareholders
for the interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct including depositors, regulators and others who have lost trust in the Company”).
152 CHEVRON CORP., 2021 PROXY STATEMENT (May 26, 2021), https://perma.cc/UYS9K4SE.
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influence.153 It argued that, as a PBC, “the Board could work toward meaningful, long-term solutions to noxious inequality.”154
The proposals and supporting statements thus reflect two
themes. One is that corporations are pursuing profits to an excessive degree. The other is that, in doing so, corporations are taking
actions that have a detrimental effect both on broadly diversified
investors and other corporate stakeholders. Purpose proposals offer stakeholder governance as a proposed solution to these concerns. They argue that stakeholder governance, as implemented
through the PBC form, empowers corporate decision-makers to
consider a broader range of corporate objectives rather than focusing exclusively on profit maximization and that, specifically,
those objectives can include the interests of non-shareholder
stakeholders.
At the same time, the statements by both proponents and issuers highlight some uncertainties in the current debate over
stakeholder governance. Significantly, the statements convey ambiguity about the appropriate relationship between shareholder
and stakeholder interests. Proponents argue that, for issuers to
adopt stakeholder governance, they must convert to a PBC, stating that, at least in Delaware, the requirement of shareholder primacy prohibits directors in a traditional corporation from giving
adequate weight to stakeholder interests. This argument is based
on the “pluralistic” conception of stakeholder governance that demands a focus on stakeholders at the expense of shareholders.155
The Richards Layton report to the JP Morgan board thus characterized stakeholder governance as a departure from current law,
warning that although directors of traditional corporations may
consider stakeholder value instrumentally, “[i]f the interests of
the stockholders and the other constituencies conflict, however,
the board’s fiduciary duties require it to act in a manner that furthers the interests of the stockholders.”156
As the Shareholder Commons, a frequent proponent of purpose proposals, explains in its inaugural annual report, “[w]ithout
forcing some companies to surrender financial value that relies
on cost externalisation, there is no way to realistically address
climate change, mass extinction, growing inequality, or pandemics, to name just a few major systemic risks.”157 Consequently, it
153
154
155
156
157

United Parcel Serv. Inc., Notice of Exempt Solicitation, supra note 146.
Id.
Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 10.
RICHARDS LAYTON & FINGER, supra note 100, at 3.
THE S’HOLDER COMMONS, supra note 134, at 3.
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maintains that a traditional corporation cannot legally operate in
accordance with the stakeholder governance model reflected in
the BRT statement, stating that “the law of the companies’ states
of incorporation precludes authentic commitment to the stakeholder model acclaimed in the BRT Statement, unless the corporations adopt benefit corporation law.”158
At the same time, those promoting PBC conversion maintain
that stakeholder governance is consistent, rather than in tension
with maximizing shareholder value. Veeva explained in its proxy
materials that “we do not believe that balancing the interests of
all stakeholders will require us to take actions that do not maximize shareholder value over the long term.”159 And even as it argues that stakeholder governance is illegal because it is inconsistent with shareholder primacy, the Shareholder Commons
stated in its proxy materials at UPS that “[t]he stakeholder orientation permitted by the PBC form is more likely to create value
for diversified shareholders than the prevailing ‘profit at any cost’
approach that imposes substantial costs on those same shareholders.”160 Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz has opined that pursuing
a corporation’s purpose “requires consideration of all the stakeholders who are critical to its success” and that this “is fully consistent with the fiduciary duties of the board of directors, and the
concomitant stewardship obligations of shareholders.”161 And Fox
News, in arguing that shareholders should not vote for the purpose proposal, stated in its proxy statement that Fox already considers stakeholder interests and that “A conversion to a PBC
would not result in any meaningful change or better serve the interests of our stockholders or other stakeholders.”162 Similarly, 3M
explained “3M is already carrying on its purpose-driven mission
by taking all stakeholders into consideration in our long-term
strategies and business operations, and living the five principles
of the BRT Statement, all of which are consistent with the General Corporation Law of Delaware under which 3M is organized.”163 Citigroup stated that “The Board believes that Citi’s existing form of corporate organization provides the appropriate
158

Id.
Veeva Sys. Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Dec. 4, 2020),
https://perma.cc/7AXT-XL9V.
160 United Parcel Serv. Inc., Notice of Exempt Solicitation, supra note 146.
161 Martin Lipton, Stakeholder Governance and Purpose of the Corporation, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 21, 2022), https://perma.cc/N8ZH-5ALD.
162 FOX CORP. 2021 NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS AND PROXY
STATEMENT 58 (Sept. 17, 2021), https://perma.cc/GCW9-C8NF.
163 Definitive Proxy Statement, supra note 159, at 120.
159
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flexibility to promote the interests of our various stakeholders
and to manage important diversity and ESG matters without the
significant uncertainties, costs, and distractions that the Proposal’s implementation would require; therefore the Board recommends a vote [against] this Proposal 10.”164
Importantly, issuers defend their consideration of stakeholder interests as consistent with, rather than in tension with,
promoting shareholder value. Wal-Mart explained, “We think
good ESG practices go hand in hand with long-term financial
value creation for our shareholders by enhancing customer trust,
securing future supply of products and services, catalyzing new
product lines, increasing productivity, and reducing costs.”165
These positions are obviously in tension. Moreover, at least
some data suggest that “more stakeholder influence, instead of
‘growing the pie’, can in fact shrink it and can undermine the very
‘stakeholderism’ model it is supposed to promote.”166 Part of the
challenge for the stakeholder model is that trade-offs among
stakeholders are inevitable.167 The conflict is not simply between
shareholders and stakeholders; it also exists among stakeholders—should a firm respond to the pandemic with plastic protective equipment to prioritize employee safety or restrict its use of
products that are harmful to the environment? In addition, there
are practical limits to the extent to which the interests of any
stakeholder group can be sacrificed—irrespective of legal obligation—without risking the flight of those stakeholders elsewhere.
As Mark Roe explains, “Purpose, if taken seriously, can be costly.
Cutting into the tight profit margins of a firm in a competitive
industry will destabilize that firm: some will suffer and shrink.
Some will not survive.”168 At least as a matter of Delaware law,
the question of how far the business judgment rule would allow a

164 CITIGROUP INC., 2021 NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT 136
(Apr. 27, 2021), https://perma.cc/VZF8-5T5G.
165 WALMART, NOTICE OF 2021 ANNUAL SHAREHOLDERS’ MEETING 97 (June 2, 2021),
https://perma.cc/9JXW-4YTJ.
166 See, e.g., Shantanu Banerjee Sudipto Dasgupta & Rui Shi, The Dark Side of Stakeholder Influence: The Surprising Effect of Customer Fraud on Suppliers (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 800/2021, 2021), https://perma.cc/KS68-7TW3
(finding customers that are able to exercise greater influence over supplier firms reduce
shareholder value in those firms).
167 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 10, at 120 (“[P]otential trade-offs between shareholders and stakeholders are ubiquitous.”).
168 Mark J. Roe, Corporate Purpose and Corporate Competition (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 601/2021, 2021), https://perma.cc/JE2J-TP8Y.
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board to consider stakeholder interests without a clear nexus to
shareholder economic value remains unclear.169
In addition, although purpose proponents defend stakeholder
governance for its power to enable corporate decision-makers to
consider non-shareholder interests, they neither explain why, under a stakeholder model, decision-makers would be compelled to
do so, nor how that consideration would address the problems
they attribute to an excessive focus on profit maximization, such
as climate change and inequality.170 As Matteo Gatti and Chrystin
Ondersma warn, it is also plausible that stakeholder governance
will be ineffective, either because the problems it addresses are
beyond the capacity of corporate leaders or because those leaders
will use their increased discretion to “maintain their advantageous status quo.”171
PBC transition proposals, in particular, place great weight on
the PBC form as a tool to promote an issuer’s adherence to stakeholder governance. The PBC has been around for several years,
and a substantial number of private corporations have adopted
the PBC form.172 Yet the PBC’s acceptance among public corporations is more limited. As of June 2021, there were at least ten
publicly traded PBCs, and the changes to the Delaware statute
have made the process of converting far easier.173 Critics have
questioned, however, whether the PBC provides a meaningful
tool for public companies that want to commit to stakeholder

169 Cf. Edward B. Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020? The Debate
over Corporate Purpose, 76 BUS. LAW. 363, 372 (2021) (emphasis added) (“Whenever courts
have been confronted with an inescapable conflict between the interests of shareholders
and the interests of other stakeholders, and have not been able to dodge the question by
deference to board discretion under the business judgment rule, the courts have affirmed
the primacy of shareholder interests.”).
170 As The Bishop Montgomery Trust explained, in support of its proposal in 3M’s
proxy statement, “A company required to balance stakeholder interests could prioritize
lowering these costs, even if doing so sacrificed higher return.” 3M Co., Definitive Proxy
Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 24, 2021) (emphasis added), https://perma.cc/Q3VSB7GS. The statement provided no basis for concluding that a company would do so. Similarly, in support of the shareholder proposal at Chevron, although arguing that as a PBC,
“Chevron could take actions that reduce any number of externalities,” Arjuna Capital and
The Shareholder Commons acknowledged that the proponent conceded that “[a]s a PBC,
Chevron would not be obligated to take these actions, but it would have the option to do
so . . . .” Chevron Corp., Notice of Exempt Solicitation by Arjuna Capital and The Shareholder Commons, supra note 146.
171 Matteo Gatti & Chrystin D. Ondersma, Can A Broader Corporate Purpose Redress
Inequality? The Stakeholder Approach Chimera, 46 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2020).
172 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
173 Christopher Marquis, Public Benefit Corporations Flourish in the Public Markets,
FORBES (June 14, 2021), https://perma.cc/Z5AS-W2WT.
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governance or a public purpose.174 Similarly, they have challenged
the claim that traditional corporations lack the legal power to
make such commitments.175
The PBC form, however, offers distinctive advantages in that
it requires corporations to specify the specific public benefits they
intend to pursue. As a result, purpose proposals can potentially
identify and generate agreement on the specific stakeholders or
public benefits that an issuer should prioritize. For example,
when Veeva converted to a PBC, it identified employees and customers as the stakeholder interests it intended to prioritize.176
Third generation proposals, like that introduced at Fox Corp. can
have the same effect. Notably, however, purpose proposals only
achieve this objective if they designate the issuer’s intended public benefit with some specificity.177
B. The Process Advantages of Purpose Proposals
Purpose proposals also highlight the process advantages of
the shareholder proposal process for exploring governance reform. First, shareholder proposals enable shareholders to initiate
governance change. Second, because most shareholder proposals
are precatory, a shareholder proposal is part of a bilateral decision-making process, in which adoption of the change requires
both board and shareholder support.178
The shareholder proposal rule is unique in that it allows a
single small shareholder, with a relatively modest ownership
stake, to put forward a proposal for change. As Lucian Bebchuk
has explained, U.S. corporate law does not permit shareholders
174 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 28, at 82 (questioning the PBC’s effectiveness as
a commitment device for public companies).
175 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 29, at 1323 (“[W]e reject the proposition that
existing law prohibits corporate decision makers from considering and incorporating the
interests of stakeholders and society; we conclude that corporations currently have the
power—and indeed the obligation—to consider those interests irrespective of their articulated purpose.”).
176 Veeva: A Public Benefit Corporation, VEEVA (last visited Feb. 12, 2022),
https://perma.cc/R2AT-Q649.
177 In that regard, the purpose proposal at Salesforce offers an example of a problematically vague articulation of the corporation’s stakeholder orientation, requiring
Salesforce to balance “three considerations:1. The shareholders’ financial interests; 2. The
best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct; and 3. A public
benefit or benefits chosen by the Board and specified in the amendment. Salesforce.com,
Inc., Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX14A6G) (2021), https://perma.cc/4NE8MVTR.
178 See Jill E. Fisch, Stealth Governance: Shareholder Agreements and Private Ordering, 99 WASH. U. L. REV. 956 (2021) (describing relative advantages of joint board-shareholder action over unilateral decisionmaking).
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unilaterally to introduce structural or governance changes, except within the limited scope afforded through amendments to the
bylaws.179 It is this limitation that has led to the use of precatory
proposals.
Yet precatory proposals have become an increasingly powerful tool. As institutional investors increasingly vote independently of management recommendations, shareholder proposals are more likely to obtain majority support. In many cases,
shareholder efforts are fueled by the support of proxy advisory
firms like ISS and Glass Lewis. And proposals that receive strong
shareholder support are increasingly likely to result in change.180
The potential value of shareholder proposals is not limited to
cases in which they obtain majority support. As Cox and Thomas
explain, “dramatic instances exist where practices first advanced
as shareholder proposals became widely adopted across public
companies, not because they initially won a majority vote but because their proponents’ persistence over a multi-year campaign
shined a light on the need for reforms.”181
Significantly, however, because the proposals are nonbinding, the changes they propose require affirmative action by the
board, and that action is subject to fiduciary principles. The
board’s duties require it to consider, inter alia, the interests of
minority shareholders and the corporation itself, preventing it
from merely acting as a rubber stamp in support of the will of the
majority of shareholders. Accordingly, reforms triggered by the
shareholder proposal process are the product of a degree of both
consensus and accountability.
These attributes are particularly appealing in the context of
stakeholder governance. In contrast, unilateral actions to stakeholder governance by the CEO—such as would occur if the CEO’s

179 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
F. 833, 844–46 (2005).
180 As the Council for Institutional Investors explained to the SEC, “shareholder proposals have been the most important vehicle by which shareholders raised—and helped
change—corporate policies on a wide range of core governance issues, including majority
voting for and annual election of directors, independent board leadership, appropriate
forms of compensation of outside directors, proxy access, board diversity, clawbacks of unearned executive compensation, appropriate accounting for stock options, fair employment
practices and meaningful sustainability reporting, to name a few.” Letter from Kenneth
A. Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Invs. & Jeffrey P. Mahoney, Gen. Couns.,
Council of Institutional Invs., to Vanessa A. Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
6 (Jan. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/9S97-5BKZ.
181 Cox & Thomas, supra note 16, at 1195; see also Letter from Kenneth A. Bertsch &
Jeffrey P. Mahoney to Vanessa A. Countryman, supra note 180, at 19–21 (describing the
impact of shareholder proposals that failed to receive majority support).
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decision to sign the BRT statement constituted a commitment by
the corporation, or by the board—would raise concerns both about
the authority of corporate decision-makers to identify and prioritize particular stakeholder interests as well as potential agency
problems.
By facilitating stakeholder governance through private ordering, purpose proposals also enable issuers to make decisions
about the relative importance of financial success, stakeholder interests, and other public benefits on a firm-specific basis.182 The
extent to which a stakeholder governance model is appropriate is
likely to vary across firms and industries. Additionally, firm-specific experimentation can generate evidence about the effectiveness of stakeholder governance in furthering public goals as well
as the potential costs such governance may impose on corporate
viability. Given the uncertainty associated with a significant shift
in operational norms, a private ordering solution is likely superior
to a one-size-fits-all mandate such as that contemplated by Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act.183
C. Potential Problems with Purpose Proposals
Purpose proposals are a promising way of enriching the debate over stakeholder governance. At the same time, there are
several distinctive ways in which they may be problematic. First,
Rule 14a–8 requires only a small ownership stake, enabling
shareholders without a meaningful economic stake in an issuer to
access the voting process. Second, Rule 14a–8 can be readily coopted by stakeholders whose interests may be in direct tension
with those of shareholders, through the simple mechanism of buying a limited number of shares. Third, the ability of the shareholder proposal rule to identify and coordinate shareholder preferences depends critically on the integrity of the shareholder
voting process. This part briefly considers all three concerns.
As noted above, an extensive literature documents that individual small investors or gadflies are the primary proponents of
shareholder proposals. Purpose proposals continue this pattern.
182 On the role of private ordering in corporate law, see Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of Litigation Bylaws, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1637 (2016), and D.
Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering with Shareholder
Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125 (2011).
183 Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 6 (2018). Notably, Warren’s
legislation would prioritize employees over other stakeholders by giving them board representation. Private ordering is also likely to enable market discipline to generate information about the most effective scope of stakeholder capitalism and to provide network
effects.
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To date, James McRitchie, Myra Young, and John Harrington
have submitted the overwhelming majority of purpose proposals.
Commentators have expressed concern that this pattern allows
small shareholders to introduce proposals for personal reasons
that have little to do with enhancing corporate value, that the
proposals subject issuers to excessive costs, and that the proposals in question may reduce issuer value.184 Indeed, these concerns played a role in the SEC’s 2020 amendments to the federal
proxy rules that substantially raised the ownership thresholds required to use Rule 14a–8.185 The SEC justified these amendments
as helping to ensure that the proponent of a shareholder proposal
has “a meaningful ‘economic stake or investment interest’ in a
company.”186 In that purpose proposals contemplate sacrificing
shareholder value in favor of other objectives, the relatively limited stake required for a shareholder to introduce such a proposal
may be particularly troubling.
At the same time, the effectiveness of a shareholder proposal
requires that it receive significant voting support. If a small
shareholder submits a proposal that is out of touch with the objectives of other shareholders, that proposal is unlikely to impact
an issuer. Moreover, Rule 14a–8 prohibits the resubmission of
proposals that fail to achieve a designated level of support, and
the SEC’s 2020 amendments increased the threshold for resubmission as well.187 The costs associated with an additional shareholder proposal, in terms of its inclusion in the proxy statement
and the vote tabulation, have always been minimal, and technology has reduced those costs further. On the other side of the scale,
although small shareholders have traditionally been responsible
for submitting the majority of shareholder proposals,188 their
184

See Cox & Thomas, supra note 16.
Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds Under Exchange Act
Rule 14a–8, supra note 19, at 70,244 (“[T]he required dollar amount and holding period
should be calibrated such that a shareholder has some meaningful ‘economic stake or investment interest’ in a company—and therefore is more likely to put forth proposals reflecting an interest in the company and its shareholders than to use the proxy process to
promote a personal interest or general cause—before the shareholder may draw on company and shareholder resources to require the inclusion of a proposal in the company’s
proxy statement . . . .”).
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Retail shareholders may be more likely to submit shareholder proposals for a variety of reasons including herding and risk aversion by institutional investors as well as a
fear of antagonizing corporations on whom they rely for 401(k) business. See Dorothy S.
Lund, Asset Managers as Regulators, 171 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (noting that a
concern over pleading corporate clients may lead institutional investors to be more conservative with respect to the issues on which they challenge management). As noted,
185
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proposals have frequently identified significant governance issues and led to broad-based reforms.189
A related but potentially more concerning problem is the ability of other stakeholders to access the voting machinery to shift
control of the corporation’s objectives. Again, commentators argued that the shareholder proposal rule has been “hijacked by a
few special interest groups” to promote personal interests or to
“publicize a general cause.”190 The concern is that the shareholder
proposal rule will be used to “push the company in a direction that
benefits special interest shareholders such as labor unions, public
pensions, and environmental groups.”191 In addition, the shareholder proposal rule does not require a shareholder to continue to
hold his or her stock after the annual meeting. If stakeholders can
access the proxy statement simply by purchasing stock, they may
seek to advance short-term goals at the expense of the long-term
best interests of the corporation.192
Despite these concerns, there are deep historical roots both
to stakeholder use of the shareholder proposal rule and to proponents of social change buying stock in order to use the shareholder
voting process as a tool for publicizing the need for change.193 One
of the best illustrations is the effort by the Medical Committee for
Human Rights, which owned five shares of Dow Chemical stock,
to use the shareholder proposal rule to seek to prohibit Dow from

however, institutional support is required for a shareholder proposal to have an impact.
Proxy advisors play a key role in generating and coordinating institutional support, an
issue that is beyond the scope of this article.
189 See Kastiel & Nili, supra note 53, at 604 (describing corporate gadflies as “setting
the agenda for what is to be voted on by shareholders”).
190 Christopher P. Giordano, Sanjay M. Shirodkar & Daniel O’Neill, Shareholder Proposal Rule Modernized—Now What?, DLA PIPER LLP (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://perma.cc/U89A-R9AB.
191 John G. Matsusaka, Why Do Managers Fight Shareholder Proposals? Evidence
from No-Action Letter Decisions, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 20, 2017),
https://perma.cc/M7QM-2Q7T; see also John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas & Irene Yi,
Opportunistic Proposals by Union Shareholders, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 3214 (2018) (finding
evidence that unions may use value-decreasing shareholder proposals to increase their
bargaining leverage).
192 On the debate over short-termism versus long-termism, see generally Jesse Fried,
The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 1554 (2015). Notably, this concern is somewhat mitigated by the 2020 amendments to Rule 14a–8 that increase the minimum ownership requirement and that apply specifically to shareholders
who have held their stock for less than three years.
193 See also Sarah Haan, Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism: SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 76 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1167, 1214–18 (describing how civil
rights would buy “one or two shares of stock to gain admittance to the [shareholders’]
meeting”).
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selling napalm.194 Another was civil rights activists’ attempts to
target Greyhound’s segregation policy through a shareholder proposal.195 Indeed, the SEC’s shift to a broader acceptance of social
policy proposals responded to potential congressional action that
would have expressly authorized shareholders to introduce proposals aimed at advancing “the general welfare.”196 That shareholder proposals might be motivated less by the economics of the
issuer and instead reflect a broader social objective is consistent
with a practice that extends back to at least the 1960s.197
Because of the ability of stakeholders to access the annual
meeting agenda by acquiring a relatively modest ownership stake
in a company, purpose proposals seem particularly well suited as
a mechanism for debate among shareholders and other potentially competing shareholder groups. Moreover, enabling stakeholders to raise their concerns through the shareholder proposal
process may be the most efficient mechanism for placing these
issues on the corporate agenda because institutional investors are
likely to be poorly positioned to identify those social policy problems most appropriate for corporate consideration.198
The potential pitfalls of allowing small shareholders and
stakeholders to submit purpose proposals are largely mitigated
by the fact that, for a shareholder proposal to have a meaningful
impact, it must command a substantial amount of voting support.
The voting process thus serves to discipline the wasteful or inappropriate use of the rule. The evolution of shareholder voting,
however, may interfere with this process. Today, an overwhelming majority of the votes cast at large publicly traded companies
are cast by institutional intermediaries.199 Those intermediaries
194 See Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), vacated, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
195 See generally Wells, supra note 73 (describing Greyhound campaign). Wells further describes the broader connection between the shareholder proposal rule and social
justice.
196 In 1970, Senator Edmund Muskie introduced this proposition in the Corporate
Participation Bill, S. 4003, 91st Cong. § 2 (1970). The SEC responded to this pressure. See
Wells, supra note 73, at 33 (“In the face of Congressional pressure the SEC soon retreated
from its hard-line opposition to social proposals, changing Rule 14a–8 in 1972 to make it
easier to make such proposals.”).
197 “The use of shareholder proposals to advance social policy goals became prevalent
in the 1960s and 1970s when shareholder proponents discovered the device’s utility.” Eric
A. Welter, Note, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Change to Certainty, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1980, 1981 n.8 (1992).
198 See Fisch, supra note 24, at 14 (“It is unclear that asset managers have the skill
set to solve complex social problems.”).
199 Id. at 2 (“[I]nstitutional investors own 70–80% of the stock in large publicly traded
companies in the United States.”).
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are agents; they exercise voting authority over the shares they
control, but individual pension fund beneficiaries and mutual
fund customers hold the economic interest in those shares.
This separation of voting power and economic interest, which
I have characterized elsewhere as “empty voting,”200 gives rise to
potential agency costs. Cathy Hwang and Yaron Nili present data
indicating that shareholders have been the driving force behind
stakeholder governance.201 The efforts they document, however,
are by institutional intermediaries.202 Institutional investors may
have a variety of reasons for favoring social policy proposals or
stakeholder governance, but those preferences may not be shared
by their beneficiaries.203 Given the outsized influence that institutional intermediaries exercise over voting outcomes, the potential
impact of the interests of fund sponsors and managers over institutional voting behavior is particularly problematic.204
Intermediation may result in institutional investors supporting stakeholder governance to a greater degree than their beneficiaries would prefer.205 It may, alternatively, produce the opposite
result. As detailed above, advocates of stakeholder governance
have been inconsistent as to whether their objective is to increase
long-term shareholder value or to enable corporations to sacrifice
shareholder value in favor of other goals. Intermediaries exercise
their voting power subject to fiduciary duties to their beneficiaries
and, although they can perhaps plausibly defend support for
stakeholder
governance
that
instrumentally
increases
200

Id.
Cathy Hwang & Yaron Nili, Shareholder-Driven Stakeholderism, 2020 U. CHI. L.
REV. ONLINE 1 (2020).
202 See, e.g., id. at 10 (describing shareholder influence over ISS and Glass Lewis voting policies). The shareholders that influence those policies are institutional investors. See
ISS Opens 2021 Policy Surveys; Glass Lewis Seeks Informal Feedback, COOLEY LLP (Aug.
16, 2021), https://perma.cc/7Q8N-C624 (explaining that, as part of its annual vote recommendation updates, “ISS collects information from institutional shareholders, corporate
issuers, corporate directors and other market constituents in the form of an annual survey”).
203 These reasons may include marketing, avoiding adverse regulatory action and currying political favor. See Schwartz, supra note 26.
204 As Bernie S. Sharfman observes, “the Big Three’s voting power is even greater
than the percentage of shares they hold under management since they have a much
greater propensity to vote their shares relative to those retail investors who hold their
shares directly in brokerage accounts.” Opportunism in the Shareholder Voting of the “Big
Three” Investment Advisers to Index Funds, 48 J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (Feb. 5, 2022).
205 In fact, institutional assets are subject to a double layer of intermediation because
a substantial amount of mutual fund money is invested through pension and 401(k) plans
in which plan sponsors choose the menu of investment options that are available to plan
participants. See Lund, supra note 188 (“The bulk of the Big Three’s revenue comes from
corporate and public pension plans and not individuals.”).
201
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shareholder value,206 at the end of the day, their loyalty runs to
shareholders and not society more generally. Indeed, to the extent
that proponents defend conversion to a PBC as necessary to enable corporations to sacrifice shareholder value in favor of the interests of other stakeholders, it is unclear that intermediaries can
support such proposals consistent with their fiduciary duties.207
Proponents of purpose proposals have defended the PBC as a tool
that enables a corporation to commit to not putting shareholders
first.208 If a corporation commits to not putting shareholders first,
can a fiduciary investing the money of its beneficiaries buy the
stock?209

206 Some commentators have defended stakeholder governance as consistent with a
“portfolio approach” that would “increase returns across the portfolio if even not maximizing for particular firms.” See, e.g., Jeffrey Gordon, Systemic Stewardship, J. CORP. L.
(forthcoming 2022); see also BlackRock, Inc., supra note 127 (explaining that “as a PBC,
BlackRock would be more likely to take actions that reduce any number of externalities
in order to improve local and global economies and returns to diversified shareholders
even if the actions reduced its long-term internal rate of return”). Systemic stewardship
claims assume, however, that a socially responsible investment will reduce the overall
level of business activities that harm an investor’s portfolio, such as carbon-intensive practices. These claims depend on the assumption that a fully diversified institutional investor
owns the entire universe of companies that could engage in such harm. It is likely, however, that an investor’s pressure on its portfolio companies to, for example, sell dirty assets, may simply result in those assets being sold to a company that is outside the investor’s portfolio, a result that does not reduce the level of socially harmful activity.
207 Julia and Paul Mahoney observe that an admission that institutions were sacrificing value for values would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. See Julia D. Mahoney
& Paul G. Mahoney, The New Separation of Ownership and Control: Institutional Investors and ESG, 2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 840 (2021) (arguing that institutions cannot sacrifice value for values consistent with their fiduciary duties); see also Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and
Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 385–86 (2020) (maintaining that a trustee’s authority to consider ESG factors is only appropriate if: “(1) the trustee
reasonably concludes that the ESG investment program will benefit the beneficiary directly by improving the risk-adjusted return; and (2) the trustee’s exclusive motive for
adopting the ESG investment program is to obtain this direct benefit”).
208 See, e.g., Goldman Sachs Grp. Inc., Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX14A6G)
(2021), https://perma.cc/D734-DGED (“[T]ransitioning to a PBC is consistent with the
aforementioned commitment to obligate our company directors’ fiduciary duties to all
stakeholders alike, not just shareholders.”).
209 The Department of Labor (DOL) adopted a rule in 2020 that appeared to limit the
power of retirement plan fiduciaries to consider non-pecuniary factors. See Quinn Curtis,
Jill Fisch & Adriana Z. Robertson, Do ESG Funds Deliver on Their Promises?, 120 MICH.
L. REV. 393, 416–18 (2021) (describing history and scope of DOL rule). The Biden Administration announced its disapproval of the rule, and on Oct. 14, 2021, the DOL proposed a
new rule that would authorize ERISA fiduciaries to consider ESG factors. Id. at 418. Nonetheless, ERISA fiduciaries continue to be concerned about potential litigation risk from
decisions that explicitly favor stakeholder governance over shareholder value. Id. For example, BlackRock’s 2022 voting guidelines appear deliberately ambiguous on this issue.
BlackRock explains that:
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As a result, it is plausible that the intermediation associated
with public company voting has the effect of suppressing the level
of support that purpose proposals would enjoy if those with skin
in the game were able to express their preferences directly.210
Moreover, concern about their fiduciary obligations may prevent
institutions from fully participating in the debate over stakeholder governance. In particular, institutions may be constrained
from arguing in favor of stakeholder governance that sacrifices
shareholder interests in favor of societal value, even if such sacrifices are the most compelling rationale for stakeholder governance.
Although these concerns about the integrity of the voting process extend beyond purpose proposals, stakeholder governance offers a particularly compelling example of the potential tension between Rule 14a–8 and the heavily-intermediated voting process.
If Rule 14a–8 is to function effectively as a tool for bringing debates over social policy inside the corporation, corporations will
need to find a way to engage the voices of their true shareholders,
not just those who manage their assets. I have identified elsewhere potential mechanisms for such engagement, including
pass-through voting, allowing mutual fund shareholders to convey their voting preferences to mutual fund managers, and increased product differentiation in the mutual fund industry.211
A separate but related concern about shareholder proposals
is the prospect that they can induce changes in corporate behavior
irrespective of the outcome of a shareholder vote if they are settled without being submitted to the shareholders. A substantial
number of shareholder proposals are settled and, as Sarah Haan

Corporate form Proposals to change a corporation’s form, including those to convert to a public benefit corporation (“PBC”) structure, should clearly articulate
how the interests of shareholders and different stakeholders would be augmented or adversely affected, as well as the accountability and voting mechanisms that would be available to shareholders. We generally support management proposals if our analysis indicates that shareholders’ interests are
adequately protected. Corporate form shareholder proposals are evaluated on a
case-by-case basis.
BLACKROCK INV. STEWARDSHIP, PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES FOR U.S. SECURITIES 20 (Jan.
2022) (emphasis added), https://perma.cc/VZ2Q-S4RL.
210 One poll reports, for example, that 75% of millennial investors “would be willing
to sacrifice some performance on their investments to achieve an ESG goal.” Kiplinger –
Domini Poll: ESG Investing Is Gaining Traction, KIPLINGER (Oct. 12, 2021),
https://perma.cc/3T7A-HHLL.
211 Fisch, supra note 24; see also Sharfman, supra note 204, at 28–29 (summarizing
several feasible mechanisms by which retail investors could convey their voting preferences to fund managers).
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warns, such settlements threaten to undermine the value of the
shareholder proposal process both in enhancing transparency and
providing a mechanism for ascertaining the preferences of a majority of shareholders.212 Haan also questions the degree to which
corporate obligations incurred in connection with the settlement
of a shareholder proposal are enforceable.213 As with intermediation, the risk of settlement is not unique to purpose proposals.
Notably, however, although shareholders have only introduced a
limited number of purpose proposals to date, one such proposal,
submitted by James McRitchie at Broadridge, has already been
settled and withdrawn.214
VI. CONCLUSION
Purpose proposals currently present both a good news story
and a bad news story. The good news story is that shareholder
proposals are again doing the work of bringing a key governance
issue—the desirability of stakeholder governance—to the forefront. Shareholders are using proposals to articulate their views,
generate management responses, and determine the extent to
which their concerns are shared by other shareholders. Moreover,
purpose proposals allow this debate to occur on a firm-by-firm basis, engaging market forces to test the viability of the stakeholder
model.
The bad news story is that purpose proposals expose the challenges that intermediated stock ownership presents for shareholder democracy. Although intermediated voting can be defended as an efficient tool for pursuing a single, clearly-defined
objective such as price maximization, intermediaries are poorly
positioned to evaluate the normative trade-offs presented by the
debate over stakeholder governance.

212 See Haan, supra note 45, at 292 (“Regardless of which theory we adopt to justify
the shareholder proposal, its ends are only served when a qualifying proposal leads to
publication in the proxy and a shareholder vote.”).
213 Id. at 322.
214 THE S’HOLDER COMMONS, supra note 141.

